My essay [The Russian Review, July 1990] was an attempt to explain the Vperedist split, led by Bogdanov, from the Bolshevik faction of the RSDLP. In contrast to earlier interpretations, I tried to show that Bogdanov did not part from Lenin over their differences of philosophy, orthodox Plekhanovist materialism versus Mach's empiriocriticism. Nor did they separate because Bogdanov dissented from the Bolsheviks' decision to participate in the Duma, although it is true that Bogdanov and Lenin did assess that participation differently. I argued, instead, what they split over was their general political approach or outlook: specifically, over Bogdanov's desire to have the Bolsheviks place their emphasis on pedagogical/propagandistic tasks. That did cause them to differ not only on how to assess participation in the Duma, but much more generally on the value of the Bolsheviks' day-to-day work in connection with the workers' mundane practical activities, "where they were at."
the view I attribute to him. How then could they have worked together from 1904 to 1909 if they differed so radically, as Sochor and Walicki assert, on the Party and its tutelary role? Walicki finds this no problem. "In fact, this might be true about Bogdanov's practice but could not be justified by his theories." In other words, Bogdanov simply did not understand the implications of his own viewpoint, or was so insufficiently committed to them that he acted against them in practice. I believe this sort of reasoning is also implicit throughout Sochor, who is prepared to find in Bogdanov's theories a "clear departure from the premises of What Is to Be Done?" regarding the tutelary role of intellectuals.
I find this sort of reasoning extremely perilous and difficult to justify. One discovers what one believes to be a crucial disagreement between individuals based on one's own analysis of their texts; then, when their practice tends to bely this disagreement, rather than seek some further explanation as to how to reconcile the disparity, one simply asserts inconsistency between theory and practice. This sort of procedure is, in general, difficult to justify, for, as we all know, the relationship between theory and practice-especially epistemology and practice!-is exceedingly elusive and certainly practice cannot be understood to follow from theory as a logical deduction. What practices do and do not follow from a given theory is always a question of complex reasoning and argument. More specifically, given the rather extreme sensitivity to the interrelationships between theory and practice in the Russian Social Democratic movement, to say that an intellectual revolutionary like Bogdanov or Lenin is simply acting in a way that is entirely inconsistent with his theory should raise doubts.
I believe that Walicki, by speaking of the relationship between practice and theory, indeed epistemology and political outlook, as if it were one of logic and deduction, has simply imposed his own idea of what practices must be inconsistent with Bogdanov's theory. I agree with him entirely that Bogdanov's epistemology was opposed to Lenin's, and that he viewed Marxism, like other theories, as expressing the experience and standpoint of a specific class, in this case, the proletariat, and not of scientific bourgeois intellectuals. Nevertheless, I believe Walicki has no basis for concluding that therefore Bogdanov must, somehow, have opposed the tutelary role of intellectuals in the workers' movement. This fails to note what seemed to Bogdanov the obvious fact that, despite its origins and significance in the proletariat's position and experience, intellectuals could grasp Marxism more systematically than could most workers, and therefore had a crucial pedagogical role to play. It fails also to note, as Aileen Kelly rightly points out [The Russian Review, July 1990] that the particular ideology which supposedly sums up the workers' experience ends up, de facto, being defined by the intellectuals and imputed to the workers. For this reason, as Kelly rightly emphasizes, despite appearances, the Bogdanovist perspective could bring about a highly paternalistic relationship between intelligentsia and the working class. As Kelly says, Bogdanov and Lenin "were united on one common belief: in the indispensability of the intelligentsia . . . The intelligentsia are precluded by their class origins from creating a collectivist ethic of the future, but they alone can define and expose deviations from it, because it is they who invented the rules of the game."
Indeed, what are we to conclude from Walicki's own evidence with respect to his view that Bogdanov simply could not have believed in the intelligentsia imposing consciousness from outside. "Bogdanov was not horrified and scandalized by the hypothesis that the Soviet state might be ruled, in the transitional period by scientific engineers rather than workers," says Walicki. But who, then, besides intellectuals like Bogdanov, were judging the appropriateness of this substitution of the rule of the technical intelligentsia for the workers and how long the supposed transition period was to last? More directly to the point, Walicki tells us of Bogdanov's "sensitivity to the dangers of a premature seizure of power," which he believed, "was better than popular anarchy," and that "the workers rule should be a result of their maturity" (Walicki's emphasis). Is this really such a long way, in practice, from the scientistic position of classical Social Democracy, supposedly abhorred by Bogdanov, whose "main aim," as Walicki tells us, was "to avoid the danger of a revolutionary voluntarism." Isn't it obvious that in both cases, it is the intellectuals who are warranted to judge just what represents mature workers' consciousness and whether the workers, in any given case, have achieved it? It should perhaps be pointed out in passing that Kelly muddies the water when, in commenting on my argument on the centrality of the tutelary role of the Party, she says that all Social Democrats, including Lenin, were, from the start, materialists and thus believed that consciousness could be changed by experience. No doubt this is true. But Lenin, Bogdanov, and the RSDLP more generally nevertheless concluded that the experience of the proletariat would not be enough in itself to lead them to adopt Social Democratic consciousness. Thus, in the turn-of-thecentury dispute opposing the Iskrists and the economists, all Social Democrats, "orthodox" and "revisionist" alike, agreed that class consciousness developed actively, through the experience of class struggle, but they disagreed about how far that struggle, left to itself, would actually go. The Iskrists-Lenin, Martov, Akselrod, and Plekhanov-argued that workers' struggle, on its own, would never transcend a reformist stage and progress to a revolutionary, Social Democratic one. The Party would make up for the lack of revolutionary activity among workers by substituting for it the Party's scientifically based worldview and program. Bog-danov shared the Iskrist perspective, and he continued to see the revolutionary process in this light after the 1905 Revolution: "The proletariat's ideological revolution-the achievement of class selfconsciousness-precedes the all-round social revolution."' Quintessentially this was the argument of the Vperedists, as well as the programmatic basis of their political unity. It was also one argument, among others, the Iskrists had deployed in favor of organizing a vanguard Party according to their specifications.
In the 1905 Revolution masses of workers engaged in activity that was revolutionary, not simply reformist or narrowly trade-unionist, so that there was now, at last, a practical basis for revolutionary consciousness. The experience of 1905 prompted Lenin to extend a materialist interpretation to this new and unprecedented activity, not to invent that interpretation out of whole cloth. Lenin's new position from 1905 that revolutionary experience could itself revolutionize workers' consciousness was therefore a major break, although I never implied that its implication was to deny the need for a Party. As Sochor has shown,7 despite Bogdanov's overt concern to prepare the workers to rule, Bogdanov grew increasingly apprehensive about the radicalization of the workers' movement in Russia between February and October because it pointed to the seizure of power by a working class not yet endowed with a well-formed proletarian culture-a clear sign that Russian Social Democrats had failed to work for the proletariat's complete ideological transformation as an indispensable precondition for socialism. And Russian Social Democrats were still, in 1917, not working for the working class's ideological demystification. Instead, they were engaged in "some kind of strange scholasticism" which excluded "all breadth and independence of thought," Bogdanov complained. Indeed, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks were not "conscious socialists" at all because they were ignorant of the "economic and historical foundations of Social Democratic teachings."8 As a result of the failure of the socialist intelligentsia to exercise a tutelary role in the workers' movement, Bogdanov logically denied the legitimacy of a number of important workers' demands, or objected to their practical realization. Specifically, he opposed the implementation of the eight-hour day; he had a very low opinion of the factory committees because so many ordinary workers and so few "experts" ran them; he denied the working class possessed "clear socialist consciousness;" and once again, as in 1905, counterposed a Social Democratic party of the 
